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Abstract
Multiple governmental agencies and private organisations have made commitments for the colonisation of Mars. Such coloni-
sation requires complex systems and infrastructure that could be very costly to repair or replace in cases of cyber-attacks. This
paper surveys deep learning algorithms, IoT cyber security and risk models, and established mathematical formulas to identify
the best approach for developing a dynamic and self-adapting system for predictive cyber risk analytics supported with Artificial
Intelligence and Machine Learning and real-time intelligence in edge computing. The paper presents a new mathematical
approach for integrating concepts for cognition engine design, edge computing and Artificial Intelligence and Machine
Learning to automate anomaly detection. This engine instigates a step change by applying Artificial Intelligence and Machine
Learning embedded at the edge of IoT networks, to deliver safe and functional real-time intelligence for predictive cyber risk
analytics. This will enhance capacities for risk analytics and assists in the creation of a comprehensive and systematic under-
standing of the opportunities and threats that arise when edge computing nodes are deployed, and whenArtificial Intelligence and
Machine Learning technologies are migrated to the periphery of the internet and into local IoT networks.
Keywords Dynamic and self-adapting systems . Artificial intelligence . Machine learning . Real-time intelligence . Predictive
cyber risk analytics . Colonisation ofMars . Cyber-risk analytics in extreme environments . Cyber-risk in outer space
Introduction
The advancements of artificial intelligence in industrial auto-
mation, triggers questions on safety and security, and whether
AI has enhanced security or increased the cyber risks in ex-
treme environments (Khan 2020), This is specifically of con-
cern in some extreme environments where cyber-attacks can
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exploration industry. Commitments on the colonisation of
Mars have emerged from multiple governmental agencies
(e.g. NASA, ESA, Roscosmos, ISRO and the CNSA) and
private organisations (e.g. SpaceX, Lockheed Martin, and
Boeing). The colonisation of Mars presents many difficulties
and hazards, such as radiation exposure, toxic soil, low grav-
ity, lack of water, cold temperatures, and social isolation. One
specific risk has been ignored until now, the risk of cyber-
attacks. Since the colonisation of space requires the
reinstalment of critical infrastructure, and such infrastructure
needs to be installed by smart machines, then we need to
anticipate that the risk assessment of such smart machines
operating autonomously, should be undertaken by other smart
machines. We also need to anticipate the cost (including the
cost of down time) required for repairing or replacing such
machine – in outer space. This cost (and cost of down time)
should be understood prior to deciding on the most appropri-
ate space systems. Although such systems can be tested prior
to deployment, the risk assessment after deployment would be
completely reliant on Artificial Intelligence (AI), because
there will be no human participation in the installation phases.
In this paper, we conduct a survey review of different
Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning (AI/ML)
methods, that could be used for the risk assessment after
deployment. Recent studies on Artificial Intelligence and
Machine Learning (AI/ML) perspectives on mobile edge
computing lack detail (Radanliev et al. 2020d), but provide
guidance on how data can be processed in real-time, reduc-
ing edge-cloud delay and inform on the topic of cognitive
cyber security at the edge. Since the risk assessment of
deployed space systems is extremely difficult, due to the
extreme conditions, this paper is focused on the topic of
predicting cyber risk loss magnitude through dynamic an-
alyt ics of cyber-at tack threat event frequencies.
Forecasting the threat events, could enable preventing such
events from occurring in the first place. Secondly, we in-
vestigate what data is required for applying AI algorithms
in dynamic risk analytics. Additional challenges addressed
in this study relate mainly to socio-technical issues, such as
technology, regulation, supply chains and control systems.
For example, investigating the perceptions of risk and
trustworthiness that emerge as a result of machine agency,
which interact with regulation, standards and policy on the
one hand and design and engineering on the other, span-
ning the physical and behavioural sciences. But the specif-
ic focus of this paper is on integrating AI/ML in the data
collection and analytics of risk through fog computing (i.e.
use of edge devices) for forward-facing predictive outputs.
We investigate a scenario where an organisation planning
for colonisation of outer space, has implemented all the
security recommendations (e.g. NIST), but the risk remains
from uncertain and unpredictive attack vectors in outer
space, at the edge of the network.
For narrowing the topic to assessment of these new types of
cyber security, the research adopts a red teaming methodology
for detecting and reducing threats and simplify compliance
with internal, industry and government regulations. A red
teaming approach is firstly applied by challenging plans, pol-
icies, systems and assumptions and adopting an adversarial
approach to IoT cyber risks. With this approach, IoT cyber
risks can be divided in three levels, edge, fog and cloud. The
fog computing is placed in the distribution network layer and
provides sufficient computational resources, low latency and
compute-intensive applications. The cloud computing level
represent a shared pool of rapidly provisioned computing re-
sources, for high computation and data storage. Hence, IoT
cybersecurity deployment in the fog and cloud computing
levels is not a big concern. The small computation capability
at the edge devices makes IoT cyber risk more likely to occur
at the edge computing level. Hence, this article is primarily
focused on the edge computing level.
Since the focus of this reviewwas the risk at the edge of the
network, we applied this as the basis of selecting the AI meth-
odologies considered in Table 1. However, there are many
techniques that are not discussed in this review. A holistic
review of all AI methodologies was considered beyond the
scope of this review, and since many AI methodologies are
not directly relevant to this topic, we selected only the most
appropriate AI methodologies. To select the most appropriate
AI methodologies, we applied a red teaming approach to iden-
tify IoT systems that are mostly affected by a few types of
network risk event. Those include: Eavesdropping Attacks,
Denial of Service (DoS) and Distributed DoS (DDoS),
Spoofing Attacks, and Man-in-the-Middle attacks (MITM).
To describe briefly the relationship between these types of
attacks, Eavesdropping Attacks is used for listening IoT com-
munications without the transmission appearing abnormal,
hence making it difficult to detect. After Eavesdropping
Attacks has gained authorisation access, Spoofing Attacks
are used to send spoofed traffic with a legitimate access to
IoT network. The MITM is just an advanced Spoofing
Attack where adversary is positioned between two IoT de-
vices and independently intercepts data and communicates
between endpoints, collecting sensitive information, dropping
packets, and causing different security vulnerabilities. The
DoS and DDoS floods the IoT devices network with traffic,
this overloads the communication and exhausts the network,
leading to IoT devices being unable to communicate. As sim-
ple as it is, this is the most common and most dangerous IoT
attack. The small computation capability at the edge devices,
make DDoS attacks really difficult to resolve. While new
cyber security is constantly been developed (e.g. ISO 3000),
the level of cyber-attack sophistication is also increasing
(NetScouts 2018) (e.g. the Mirai variants ‘VPN filter’ is de-
livered in multiple stages with modularised payload; ‘TORii’
uses its own encryption and evasion tactic). Considering these
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continuous changes, to assess the effectiveness of cybersecu-
rity, we need cyber analytic approaches that can handle real
time intelligence in the form of probabilistic data collected at
the edge. But the effectiveness of cybersecurity should not
only be measured by the protection of cyberspace, but also
with the protection of assets that can be reached via cyber-
space (Davis et al. 2019).
In brief, we investigate the role of AI/ML in cyber risk
analytics with use of confidence intervals and time bound
ranges at the edge. The objective of such an approach would
be to protect data integrity, while securing predictive analytic
outputs and integrating such solutions in these new types of
edge computing cyber security. In edge computing, the IoT-
augmented physical reality is open to adversarial behaviours
that are yet uncharted and poorly understood, especially the
socio-technical dimensions. This paper evaluates the impact
of compromise in terms of its safety implications and resulting
consequences on end system provision.
Research methodology
The research methodology applied consist of a survey review
investigating different deep learning and machine learning
algorithms and their application in AI for securing the edge.
The survey review is used for investigating the intersections
between cyber risk and technology, regulatory interventions,
and economics.
The research methodology in this was survey review paper,
was developed to address the (un)availability of data.
Although there is a valid concern about the (un)availability
of data, in the present digital age, the IT and IoT devices create
a large volume of data. Hence, the real challenges that remain,
are in developing suitable data strategies to utilise this new
data. Simultaneously, the cyber security architecture for com-
plex coupled systems, demands data strategy optimisation and
decision making on collecting and assessment of probabilistic
data. With consideration of the above, the research integrates
impact assessment models, with AI and risk analytics models,
for developing a dynamic and self-adopting data analytics
methodology to assess, predict, and analyse cyber-risks.
For risk assessment of systems for colonising outer space,
we need a quantitative risk impact estimation is needed – for
estimating cyber security and cyber risk at the edge
(Radanliev et al. 2020e). Our argument is that without a dy-
namic real-time probabilistic risk data and cyber risk analytics
enhanced with AI/ML, these estimations can be outdated and
imprecise. We are concerned not just with securing a system,
but to acknowledge that failure and compromise will occur
and address how the system responds in these circumstances.
This is an important methodological principle which distin-
guishes out work within the cybersecurity domain. Recent
Table 1 AI/ML algorithm application for descriptive, predictive, and prescriptive risk analytics in edge computing
AI/ML technique Application References
Deep learning – ANN Network architecture Berman et al. (2019), Diro and Chilamkurti (2018),
Roopak et al. (2019), Vinayakumar et al. (2019)
Anomaly detection, unsupervised learning,
classification
Network planning/load balancing Gebremariam et al. (2019), Ullah et al. (2019)
Regression Hu et al. (2017)
Classification – Bayesian networks Fault and failure detection/
management
Bashir et al. (2019), Sultana et al. (2019)
Classification/Clustering – autoencoders Al-Turjman (2020)




Cui et al. (2019), Nguyen et al. (2019)
ANN (RNN) and random forest Park et al. (2018)
Regression – ANN Anagnostopoulos and Hadjiefthymiades (2019)
Classification – Naive Bayes (NB) (Syafrudin et al. (2018), Yin et al. (2019)
Classification algorithms: K nearest
neighbours, SVM
Guo et al. (2018), Sangaiah et al. (2019),
Zhang et al. (2019)
GDNN J. Wang et al. (2019a), X. Wang et al. (2019b)
ANN Network security and breach detection Sun et al. (2019)
Dynamic game – Nash Folk theorem Abegunde et al. (2016)
Game theory and NB classifier Bui et al. (2017), Moura and Hutchison (2019)
Deep learning algorithms Blanco-Filgueira et al. (2019), Li et al. (2018)
Algorithms: supervised, unsupervised and
reinforcement learning
Cao et al. (2019)
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literature confirms diverse cyber risks from IoT systems
(Maple 2017), including risks in IoT ecosystems (Tanczer
et al. 2018) and IoT environments (Breza et al. 2018), such
as risk from smart homes (Eirini Anthi et al. 2019; Ghirardello
et al. 2018), the Industrial IoT (Boyes et al. 2018), and chal-
lenges in security metrics (Agyepong et al. 2019).
Cybersecurity solutions for specific IoT risks are also emerg-
ing at a fast rate, such as new models on opportunities and
motivations for reducing cyber risk (Safa et al. 2018), adaptive
intrusion detection (E. Anthi et al. 2018), security economic
by design (Craggs and Rashid 2017), highlighting the privacy
requirements (Anthonysamy et al. 2017) and strategies for
achieving privacy (Van Kleek et al. 2018). Therefore, our
methodology is based on mathematical principles and quanti-
tative data. In recent publications on this topic (Radanliev
et al. 2020b), we discovered that the lack of probabilistic data
leads to qualitative cyber risk assessment approaches, where
the outcome represents a speculative assumption. Emerging
quantitative models are effectively designed with ranges and
confidence intervals based on expert opinions and not proba-
bilistic data (Buith 2016).
Survey of AI/ML algorithms
The AI/ML are essential for advancing beyond the limitations
of Value-at-Risk (VaR) models (FAIR 2017), where Bayesian
and frequentist methods are applied with and beyond VaR
models (Malhotra 2018). This requires federated learning
and blockchain based decentralised AI architecture where AI
processing shifts from the cloud to the edge and the AI
workflow is moved and data restricted to the device
(Porambage et al. 2019). Current gaps in cyber risk analytics
are in the areas of descriptive, predictive, and prescriptive
analytics (Barker et al. 2017). Hence, a survey of AI/ML ap-
plications is presented in Table 1, to address the main ques-
tions emerging from this study on edge computing and de-
scriptive, predictive, and prescriptive risk analytics.
Table 1 confirms that by integrating AI/ML in the risk
analytics, we can devise a new approach for cognitive data
analytics, creating a stronger resilience of systems through
cognition in their physical, digital and social dimensions.
This approach resolves around understanding how and when
compromises happen, to enable systems to adapt and continue
to operate safely and securely when they have been compro-
mised. Cognition through AI/ML and how cognitive real time
intelligence would enable systems to recover and become
more robust is evaluated in more detail below. The survey in
Table 1 is informed by but avoids overlapping with a series of
working papers and project reports on IoT cyber risk, IoT risk
assessment and IoT at the edge found in pre-prints online. This
research is specifically focused on AI/ML in IoT risk analyt-
ics, and it benefits from this established research knowledge.
But with a focus on the topic of securing the edge through AI/
ML real time analytics to build stronger transformative and
impactful understanding on the topic.
Majority of the current Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)
are based on ML algorithms and the CNN (Convolutional
Neural Network) + LSTM (Long Short TermMemory) appear
to perform better than other Deep Learning (subsets of ML)
models (Roopak et al. 2019). Such arguments are difficult to
generalise when tested with a single dataset. Deep Neural
Network (DNN) has been applied with distributed deep learn-
ing to collect network-based and host-based intrusion detec-
tion systems (NBID and HBID) (Vinayakumar et al. 2019).
This is a very comprehensive study, where a multilayer
perceptron (MLP) model is adopted. However, in a related
research, the MLP (type of artificial neural network - ANN)
was found to be the least accurate deep learning model
(Roopak et al. 2019).
Network Based Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) that
use statistical measures or computer thresholds have been
related to security research since the early days of computer
architecture (Vinayakumar et al. 2019). But are ineffective
for current cyber risk analytics of connected and highly com-
plex ICT systems, because they present high rates of false
negatives (failure to detect) and false positives (false alerts).
Distributed attack detection at fog level was proven to be
more scalable than centralised cloud for IoT (Diro and
Chilamkurti 2018). If the attack vectors are known, then up
to 99.999% accuracy can be reached by type of attack with
bidirectional long short-term memory (LSTM) units intro-
duced to recurrent neural network (RNN) (Berman et al.
2019). Similarly, a Siamese Network Classification
Framework (SNCF) can alleviate imbalance in risk predic-
tion and present more reliable results when compared with
other algorithms (Sun et al. 2019). With SNCF two different
types of risk data sets can be used, (1) public data set (less
features and more samples), (2) real data set (more features
and less samples). The first set could verify solving the im-
balance problem, and the second could eliminate reliance on
the characteristics of feature engineering. Such experimental
SNCF results have shown good cyber risk prediction perfor-
mance (Sun et al. 2019) and Software Defined Networking
Technology (SDN) has been effective in detecting and mon-
itoring network security when integrated with Machine
Learning (ML) and deep learning (DL) to create SDN-
basedNIDS (Sultana et al. 2019). Themain risk concernwith
SDN and Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV) is the
centralised nature which creates a single point of failure
(Gebremariam et al. 2019). To resolve this, three layered
nodes (Edge-IDS, Fog-IDS, and Cloud-IDS) has been pro-
posed for NIDS system in SDN-based cloud IoT networks
(Nguyen et al. 2019). Cloud environments enable IoT device
virtualisation resulting with virtual IoT objects that can be
accessed and controlled remotely though a dynamic virtual
network (Ullah et al. 2019).
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Apower load forecasting (Hu et al. 2017), can be based on the
generalised regression neural network with decreasing step fruit
fly optimisation algorithm. Similarly, logistic regression and
multicriteria decision making in IoT fog computing can be used
for resource allocation (Bashir et al. 2019). Themain concern we
have about the development of such algorithms is that deploy-
ment of 5G can separate real-time intelligence and security be-
tween IoT, IoE or even IoNT (Al-Turjman 2020). Hence, intel-
ligence and cognition techniques would differ in application
areas and architecture. One of the possible issues is that ML
platforms (such as TensorFlow, Gaia, Petuum, Apache Spark,
and GraphLab), are designed for offline data analytics and train-
ing data are collected, partitioned, and learned offline to construct
machines for data analytics (Cui et al. 2019). While some of the
recently proposed detection systems for edge computing are op-
erating in real time, e.g. LiReD (Park et al. 2018). Edge nodes
can host and process the data to limit latency, and recently en-
hanced models can handle the earlier problems with missing
values (Anagnostopoulos and Hadjiefthymiades 2019), while
improving the detection accuracy (Yin et al. 2019) and decision
making with early warning systems (Syafrudin et al. 2018). The
classification accuracy can also be improved with edge filtering
(Guo et al. 2018), position confidentiality (Sangaiah et al. 2019)
and dynamic data classification (Zhang et al. 2019), to avoid
system overload when tasks increase suddenly, by diverting
and allocating complex tasks to devices with stronger computing
power.
Multi-Access Edge Computing based on reinforcement learn-
ing, enhances the performance of such ‘offloading’ in polynomi-
al time complexity - worst-case running time (J. Wang et al.
2019a). While integration of Deep Reinforcement Learning and
Federated Learning with mobile edge systems, optimises mobile
edge computing, caching, and communication, and makes edge
systems more intelligent (X.Wang et al. 2019b). Optimising and
balancing resource constrains in edge computing has been inves-
tigated with ‘dynamic game’(Abegunde et al. 2016) and ‘game
theory’ (Moura and Hutchison 2019) strategies. Such optimisa-
tion is primarily theoretical, but highly relevant for red teaming of
edge computing risks. Two models ‘Cournot’ and ‘Stackelberg’
are proposed for making real-time optimisation of traffic flow
(Bui et al. 2017). These models need to be tested with real-time
data to be verified, but the theoretical contribution is quite signif-
icant, e.g. applying the ‘Prisoners Dilemma’ on optimising
decisions.
Deep learning models recorded highest accuracy as 97.16%
detection of DDoS attacks (Roopak et al. 2019), and the multi-
layered structure, makes them very adoptable to edge computing.
Hence, deep learning has been applied for optimising perfor-
mance while protecting user privacy in uploading data, (Li
et al. 2018). But the computing andmemory requirements, along
with the high power consumption, make them difficult to use in
edge computing (Blanco-Filgueira et al. 2019). Further research
is needed to identify how deep learning can be applied in
practice, with real-time data. Possibly reinforcement learning,
supervised/unsupervised learning, and deep reinforcement learn-
ing (Cao et al. 2019), would provide some insights into how this
can be achieved.
Elements of artificial intelligence and machine
learning in cognition engine design
Cyber risk analytics at present is reactive and assessments are
based on risk/loss events that already occurred (Radanliev
et al. 2020a). AI/ML in forward-looking predictive analytics
enable threat intelligence prediction and faster attack detec-
tion. The main advantage of AI in risk analytics is the fast
processing and analysis of big data where parsing, filtering
and visualisation is done in near real time (Radanliev et al.
2020c). Machine learning uses mathematical and statistical
methods and algorithms that learn, build and improve models
from data. This enables design of a cognition engine in the
form of automated predictive cyber intelligent software agents
that identify, assess and record cyber-attacks. After this, nat-
ural language processing (NLP) can be applied to perform
behaviour analytics and create baseline profiles of normal be-
haviour and then monitor for abnormalities while continuous-
ly learning from the profile’s behaviour patterns. Facilitating a
consistent and repeatable detection of threat indicators and
predictions about new persistent risks that are undetected.
AI/ML learn from multiple patterns (e.g. threat intelligence
feed, device event logs, vulnerability information, contextual
data) to determine predictive risk insights. Predictive risk an-
alytics for advance notice of risk exposure and potential loss
can be performed through monitoring the risk lifecycle activ-
ities, e.g. the reactive activities that capture losses and near
miss events. From reactive activities we can quantify the im-
pact of losses and develop baseline indicators to compare
mathematical results.
Mathematical formulae
To develop predictive risk analytic methodology for estimat-
ing the loss of cyber risk, we apply adapted version of the
aggregate loss method to compound a Poisson discrete prob-
ability distribution. For the adopted version, we use the theo-
retical cumulative distribution function of aggregate loss, as
shown in (Charpentier 2014):
FLc lð Þ ¼ ∑
þ∞
n¼0






In the adapted version, we generate the frequency distribu-
tion from the cumulative function in Eq. 1, with non-linear
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summation and simulated random variables to approximate
the theoretical function.
The Lc = aggregate loss distribution consisting of the com-
pound sum of N = frequency (intensity) and Zi = severity




Zi;where Lc ¼ 0; if N ¼ 0:
Considering the (un)availability of probabilistic data, theN,
Zi, and the consequent Zj where (i jÞ are considered inde-
pendent. This cumulative function defines a frequency distri-
bution for aggregate loss as nonlinear summation. The func-
tion can be improved by considering the frequency distribu-
tion as Poisson variable, where for a given time interval [0,tc],
the inter-arrival time = Si of two ‘risks’ within the interval
follows an exponential distribution with parameter λc. This
function can be described as:
P N tð Þ ¼ nð Þ ¼ exp −λctcð Þ λctcð Þ
n!
ð2Þ
Y i ¼ Si−Si−1∼Exp λcð Þ; F Y < yð Þ ¼ 1−exp −λcf yg ð3Þ
The known issues with (un)availability of sufficient prob-
abilistic data (Radanliev et al. 2018) can be mitigated by en-
hancing the precision of the sample size in the inter-arrival
time, where the insufficient (few years) data can be considered
as lognormal (Galton) distribution where tc =365
(representing 365 days). In a more specific dataset scenarios,
the distribution will vary depending on the probabilistic data.
We postulate that the tc =365 has a fixed loss per day = b,
where Mx = total loss days for an IoT device IoTx and the
device is operational at time t and the total loss per tc = b
×Mx. Considering that IoT device can stop functioning (or
be killed by grey-hat attack) at any point in tc, thenMx repre-
sents a continuous random variable of the future (potential)
loss from an IoT device infected for time x and 1(.), with a
given discount rate = r calculated as v = (1 + r)−1, then con-
sidering the probability of IoT device stops (or be killed) and
the discount factor, the present potential loss Px can be deter-
mined as:
Px ¼ v 1 Tx>1ð Þ  bMxð Þ ð4Þ
This formula calculates the risk of loss depending on the
IoT device surviving the entire 365 days, or stops (or be killed)
during the 365 days. The second postulate is that the risk of
loss is eliminated when the device is killed. The actuarial
equivalent of this can be explained as the present values of
the expected losses described as loading = δ and expected
revenue (that was lost) = πχ are equal to:
πχ ¼ 1þ δð Þ  E Pxð Þ ð5Þ
In time, when more extensive data from IoT devices be-
comes available, more precise δ can result with lowering the
expected loss = ∝ and amore precise expected present value of
the loss = E P1χ
 
can be estimated as:
E P1χ
 
¼ ∝ E Pxð Þ ð6Þ
and expected revenue (that was lost) as:
P1χ ¼ 1þ δð Þ  E P1χ
 
ð7Þ
The continuous random variable of the future (potential)
loss Mx can be divided on the number of attacks (frequency)
=Nx and the and severity (loss)¼ Zi per breach in a given tc
can be denoted as Rx, i and Nx would reflect a Poisson distri-
bution with time-varying intensity θχ,and Rχ, 0 and Rχ, 1 =Υχ,
1 + 1 where Υχ, 1 follows time-varying intensity =λχ. TheMx





With a compound Poisson process, the probable present
potential lossPxwith a givenMx in a given tc for an IoT device
IoTx, can be calculated with:
P Mx ¼ nð Þ ¼
exp −θχ
 







  jexp− jλχ þ θχ 





The above equation is designed for IoT risk assessment, but
it can easily be adopted for different types of cyber risks. For
example, we could calculate IoT cyber risk from AI as κ for a
given IoT device IoTxwith κ π1χ, where in the first instance,





Mx þ Lc ð10Þ
and evaluated with risk proxies from shortfall probability,
Value at Risk and Conditional Tail Expectation. The shortfall
probability can be calculated as:
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Prob Shortfallð Þ ¼ Prob κ π1χ≤Lκ
 
ð11Þ
where expected shortfall is:
E Shortfallð Þ ¼ E max κ π1χ−Lκ; 0
  
ð12Þ
With r (described earlier), and the threshold =ρ, Value at
Risk can be calculated as:





CTE ρð Þ ¼ E LκjLκ≥VaR ρð Þð Þ ð14Þ
With the VaR and CTE risk proxies, we can calculate the
risk margin ratio = δ(L) with the Solvency 2 Directive percen-
tile method:
δ Lð Þ ¼ ρ Lð Þ−E Lð Þ
E Lð Þ ð15Þ
where ρ(L) represents VaR and CTE risk measures, and E(L)
the best estimate. If this is considered with an assumption that
losses would be larger than ransoms: ∝ of losses ≤ ∝ of ran-
soms. Then the power-law distribution can be calculated with
the equation:
P xð Þ ¼ ∝X −∝ ð16Þ
where the variance analysis of ∝ parameter is 1 < ∝ < 2, with
infinite mean and average even when 2 < ∝ < 3.
Cognitive design
Connecting the lost exposure of cyber risk from human-
computer interaction (frequency), in different information
knowledge management systems (magnitude), with artificial
intelligence, can provide predictive feedback sensors for
primary and secondary loss (vulnerabilities). These feedback
sensors represent dynamic real time data mechanisms that
assist and enable better understanding of the vulnerabilities -
prior to cyber-attacks. The reliability of cyber risk analytics
could increase significantly if decisionmakers have a dynamic
and self-adopting AI enhanced feedback sensors to assess,
predict, analyse and address the economic risks of cyber-
attacks.
The survey (in Table 1) identified all relevant AI algo-
rithms, and the mathematical formulae (results in Table 2)
articulates some of the possible solutions for the role of these
algorithms in designing dynamic automated predictive feed-
back cognitive system, supported with real-time intelligence.
Cyber risk analytic approaches with dynamic real-time and
AI/ML self-adapting enhanced technologies that enable pre-
dictive risk analytics are identified in Table 1. While the de-
sign of a predictive cyber risk analytics is based on confidence
intervals and time bound ranges in Table 2. In doing this work
we are acutely aware that adding automation and further cou-
pling to a distributed system also brings new opportunities for
cascading effects and exposing new attack surfaces. These
concerns are fundamental in the areas with increased automa-
tion of processes which have classically required human
interaction.
Dynamic and self-adapting predictive data analytics
with the mathematical formulae
A range of data sources was used to apply data analytics with
the new mathematical formulae. The Comprehensive Threat
Intelligence was used to collect data from vulnerability reports
and zero-day reports (Cisco 2020). The Chronology of Data
Breaches (Land et al. 2020) was used to gather larger sample
size from thousands of records collected over the last 10 years
(2010–2020). The SonicWall cyber threat report was used to
collect probabilistic data on trends of IoT attacks (SonicWall
2019). The aggregate cyber risk from a large sample popula-
tion is not the ideal measure for calculating the cyber risk of a
small and/or medium sized enterprise. Hence, we divided the
large sample into subsamples that follow a Poisson distribu-
tion with smaller total risk λc, where:
λc ¼ λc1 þ…þ λcm ð17Þ
and λci, i = 1,…m represented as the individual risk of a sub-
sample. Finally, the total cyber risk of the adjusted proportion
parameter p is equal to λc = pλc. We estimate risk exposure of
total IoT cyber risk p1 and the IoT cyber risk from non-
recorded devices as p2 where:
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p ¼ p1  m p−12
 
; ð18Þ
To demonstrate how these models can be applied for nu-
merical results, in this section we present a demonstration
project of different numerical results. For the numerical esti-
mates in Table 2, we generate 100,000 Monte Carlo simula-
tion runs, for 10,000 IoT devices being hacked. We use these
Monte Carlo simulation runs to compare the effectiveness of
different risk measures to quantify cyber risk, using the esti-
mate of aggregate distribution of total loses (primary and sec-
ondary). We assume that by understanding the cyber risk, we
can lower the frequency of cyber breaches (∝ = 0.9). In the
next paragraph, we detail our data sources, and how we ob-
tained the required data to present the demonstration of nu-
merical results in Table 2. In the demonstration project, we
adopted the numerical results to compare the estimated risk
measures under different risk levels: Guarded (Green);
Elevated (Yellow); High (Amber); Severe (Red).
m = independent sample size. If we assume thatm= 10,000
and p = 0.00002. The p = 0.00002 derived from the findings
that IoT devices are attacked within 5 min of being connected
to the internet (NetScouts 2018), while over 50% of the cyber
risk professionals do not keep inventory of IoT devices
installed (SFG 2017), hence there are potentially over 50%
more IoT devices exposed to attacks. This is calculated as
365 (days in a year) × 24 (hours per day) × 60 (minutes per
hour) – 50% (the cyber-attacks on not recorded IoT devices)1
where ten times p = ‘high (amber)’ risk, twenty times p =
‘severe (red)’ risk. This reflects on findings that IoT will in-
crease at a rate of 152,200 devices per minute by 2025 (Rosen
2015) × 525,600 (minutes in 365 days) = 80billion new IoT
devices connected annually. This will increase the overall IoT
cyber risk level. The twenty times assumption is based on the
SonicWall report (SonicWall 2019) stating that IoT malware
attacks increased by 215.7% from 10.3 m in 2017 to 32.7 m in
2018 and the trend continued in 2019.2 The twenty times
assumption represents .99 in Table 1. The corresponding .95
and .90 derive from the .99 calculation. We can also realisti-
cally assume that ‘guarded (green)’ level of cyber maturity
would lower the ∝ = .90, then we can calculate the shortfall
probability, expected shortfall, VaR and CTE for different
cyber risk levels and tail risk under different assumptions in
Table 1.
While existing cyber risk assessment models are based on
individual risk calculation metrics, the approach presented in
the mathematical formulae and demonstrated in Table 1, is
based on multiple numerical risk metrics. The quantitative
1 365×24×60×.5= 262,800÷5=52,560÷262,800=0.2÷10,000
2 SonicWall report (SonicWall 2019) captured real-world data frommore than
one million sensors in over 215 countries with over 140,000 malware samples
collected daily.
Table 2 Dynamic and self-adapting predictive cyber risk analytics based on different levels of cyber risk intelligence





High (Amber) Severe (Red)
E P1χ
 
9,225,798 8,302,872 8,323,645 8,495,883 8,826,248.5
Prob κ π1χ≤Lκ
 
0.362% 0.390% 0.717% 2.952% 4.359%
E max κ π1χ−Lκ; 0
  
776 783 31,660 281,340 807,491
VAR(.90) 9,659,815 8,696,453.5 8,706,061 8,797,711.5 8,947,727
VAR(.95) 9,785,002.5 8,807,375.5 8,823,096.5 9,020,017.5 9,510,794.5
VAR(.99) 10,020,820.5 9,031,839.5 9,092,977.5 11,314,474.5 14,126,426.5
CTE(.90) 9,823,671.5 8,844,958.5 9,021,798 10,482,011.5 13,461,685
CTE(.95) 9,930,712 8,942,115.5 9,283,971 12,076,385 17,770,438
CTE(.99) 10,139,834 9,137,848.5 10,729,379.5 22,130,721.5 45,991,022
E P1χ
 
= Expected present value of the loss;
Prob κ π1χ≤Lκ
 
= Prob(Shortfall) or Shortfall probability;
E max κ π1χ−Lκ; 0
  
= E(Shortfall) or Shortfall of expected present value of the loss;
VAR(ρ) = Value at Risk;
CTE(ρ) = Conditional Tail Expectation
Note: Assuming N = 1000, b = 1000, r = 0.03, ∝ = 0.9, δ = 0.1 in the IoT cyber risk calculation and number of repetitions = 100,000
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approach of the mathematical formulae, when integrated with
Excel Macros, presents risk categorisations (Table 1) that are
supported with real time intelligence. This presents a dynamic
and self-adopting predictive cyber risk analytics approach,
that is compliant with the existing NIST ‘traffic lights’ risk
categorisations. The quantitative approach also correlates the
NIST standards with the FAIR Institute efforts for quantitative
cyber risk analytics. The mathematical formulae is similar to
the FAIR-U approach (FAIR 2020), but instead of relying on a
specific risk metric, its reliant on multiple numerical risk met-
rics. For comparison, the mathematical formulae uses differ-
ent tail risk measurement and compares the impact of cyber
risk under different risk categories. The ‘high (amber)’ and
‘severe (red)’ risk categories derive numerical representation
of how rare and extreme events (black swan events) can in-
crease the cyber risk impact. The impact of risk in VaR (.90)
and CTE (.90) is not significant, but the risk margin ration
increases significantly when compared to VaR (.99) and
CTE (.99). This provides a quantitative perspective of impact
from ‘black swan’ events, and enables more informative de-
cision making on implementation of low cost and low security
vs higher cost and higher security IoT systems, while putting
‘black swan’ events in IoT risk perspective. Worth noting that
although IoT devices today are attacked within 5 min of being
connected to the internet (NetScouts 2018), computers con-
nected to internet even back in 2007 were attacked on average
every 39 s (Cukier 2007). Given that computers even in 2007
had much more computing power than most IoT devices to-
day, we can anticipate a continuous increase in attack frequen-
cy on IoT devices. Although such assumptions given the lack
of data can only be described as super forecasting, the estimat-
ed average attack detection and mitigation in terms of the
5 min from connection to attack timeframe, can be described
with different ML algorithms. Comparing the average attack
detection and mitigation time in Fig. 1. with multiple algo-
rithms (Nguyen et al. 2019), including Distributed Edge-
based Defence (DED), Centralised Fog-based Defence
(CFD), Centralised Fog and Cloud-based Defence (CFCD)
and SeArch architecture.
The average attack detection and mitigation time Fig. 1,
shows that although some of the NIDS described earlier, can
detect IoT attacks within the 5 min average attack time from
the moment of connection, none of the NIDS shown in Fig. 1
can mitigate IoT attacks instantly. Therefore, understanding
the risks before they occur is of a significant relevance to
preventing severe impact from IoT attacks.
Conclusion
This study reviewed how different AI methods can be applied
for cyber risk analytics in extreme environments, such as ex-
ploration of outer space, where AI would need to perform all
the tasks, including its own risk assessment. The review con-
firms that for the integration of AI/ML in risk analytics, we
need to adapt the data strategies to collect the appropriate
cyber-risk data. With the integration of IoT systems, new
types of data streams are becoming available. Such data
streams can be collected and analysedwith AI/ML algorithms.
The survey review in this paper, identified some of the poten-
tial impact assessment approaches that can be redesigned for
predictive, dynamic and self-adopting cyber risk analytics.
The conclusion builds upon the existing approach for
categorising (pooling) risk, but presents a quantitative version
of the NIST ‘traffic lights’ system (demonstrated in Table 2),
enhanced with multiple risk calculation metrics that calculate
the shortfall probability, expected shortfall, VaR and CTE for
different cyber risk levels and tail risk under different assump-
tions (see Table 2).
The mathematical formulae present a better understanding
of the cost and risk evaluation with multiple risk calculation
metrics for different cyber risk levels and tail risk under dif-
ferent assumptions. The value of safety and cyber risk in ex-
treme environments – such as outer space, can be explained in
economic terms, where the level of cybersecurity is based on
the risk acceptance level and the co-ordination of sufficient
protection of the communications networks.
This study presents a mathematical formula for the future
cyber risk developments that are reshaping the data analytics
of supply and control systems. The mathematical formulae
represent an advancement and integration of the NIST ‘traffic
lights’ system and the FAIR-U Tool, though ‘pooling’ of risk
data into calculation metrics, while anonymising data from
individual IoT devices.
Secondly, the co-ordination of supply and control systems
cyber protection though AI/ML must be reliable to prevent
abuse from the AI itself. The mathematical formulae in this
article relies on multiple risk calculation metrics, while
existing cyber risk assessment approached are designed with
Fig. 1 The average attack detection and mitigation on IoT connected
devices
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individual risk calculation metrics. The integration of multiple
risk metrics presents a more robust protection from abuse of
individual data intelligence streams.
Thirdly, the predictive cyber risk analytics as presented in
the article, are based on different levels of risk intelligence that
are ‘pooled’ into numbers and not presented as individual risk
events. Hence, it allows for anonymising the risk data, and
after applying the mathematical model, the data is presented
into anonymous risk categories.
Limitations and further research
AI/ML in cyber risk data analytics integrated in the sup-
ply chains and control systems would present innovative
and cost-effective ways to protect such data. In addition,
the AI/ML analysis of the threat event frequency, with a
dynamic and self-adopting AI enhanced methodology,
would empower the design of a cognition engine mech-
anisms for predicting the loss magnitude through the
control, analysis, distribution and management of proba-
bilistic data. The development of such cognitive engine
and its application, would undoubtedly bring multiple
benefits and would enable deeper understanding of the
impact of cyber risk at the edge. Nonetheless, IoT net-
works represent complex coupled systems (D. De Roure
et al. 2019), that can be described as cyber-physical so-
cial machines (Madaan et al. 2018) and social machines
(David De Roure et al. 2015) should be observed in
practice (Shadbolt et al. 2019). Given that IoT is consid-
ered as critical enabler (Lee et al. 2019a) of value crea-
tion (Lee et al. 2019b), the findings of this study would
probably be best verified when observed in practice.
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